Universität Bonn

Trimester Program: "Mechanism Design and Related Topics"


May - August 2009

Organizers: Benny Moldovanu

Description: Mechanism Design is the synthetic analysis of the design of institutions and of the effect of those institutions on social outcomes. The main focus is on the design of mechanisms which satisfy certain objectives under the assumption that the interacting agents possess private information and act strategically. Besides an elegant body of theory, there are numerous applications (e.g., to practical auction design).

This Hausdorff Trimester Program brought together leading experts from the different mathematical areas which are involved into the subject and stimulated discussions and new research.

Associated Events: 
Workshop 1: Incentives, Efficiency, and Redistribution in Public Economics
Workshop 2: Information and Dynamic Mechanism Design
Workshop 3: Multidimensional Mechanism Design


Publications

No.
Author(s)
Title
Preprint
Publication
2009b01 Barbosa, Klenio Free-riding in procurement design  
2009b02 Erdil, Aytek; Klemperer, Paul A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions ssrn.1478658 appeared in Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 8 (2-3), 2010, p. 537–547
2009b03 Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Mclennan, Andrew; Tourky, Rabee Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains MR3055653
2009b04 Gorelkina, Olga Precluding collusion in auctions  
2009b05 Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials   MR2438373
2009b06 Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Tercieux, Olivier Rationalizable implementation ssrn.1531738 MR2890650
2009b07 Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy Contracts for experts with opposing interests  
2009b08 Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values MR2988651
2009b09 Berger, André; Müller, Rudolf; Naeemi, Seyed Hossein Characterizing incentive compatibility for convex valuations appeared in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 5814, 2009, p. 24-35
2009b10 Araujo, Aloisio P.; Moreira, Humberto; Vieira, Sergei The nonoptimality of the marginal tariff approach without single-crossing  
2009b11 Yin, Xundong Optimal delegation in common agency  
2009b12 Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny Locally robust implementation and its limits pdf MR2996654
2009b13 Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher Search with adverse selection pdf MR3458926
2009b14 Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen Specialization and partisanship in committee search ssrn.1703170 MR3106959

Participants

Name
Affiliation
Malin Arve Toulouse School of Economics and EHESS
Klenio De Souza Barbosa Toulouse School of Economics and EHESS
Andreas Blume University of Pittsburgh
Tilman Börgers University of Michigan
Juan Carlos Ponce Carbajal University of Queensland
Aytek Erdil University of Oxford
Olga Gorelkina Toulouse School of Economics
Jeanne Hagenbach Université Paris I
Serge Izmalkov Universität Moskau
Paula Jaramillo University of Rochester
Anastasia Kartasheva University of Pennsylvania
Cagatay Kayi University of Maastricht
Rohit Lamba Princeton University
Stefan Lauermann University of Michigan
Eric Maskin School of Science
Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn University of California, Los Angeles
Benny Moldovanu Universität Bonn
Dov Monderer Technion Israel Institute of Technology
Tymofiy Mylovanov Pennsylvania State University
Rudolf Müller Maastricht University
Seyed Hossein Naeemi Maastricht University
David C. Parkes Harvard University
Marek Pycia UCLA
Maher Said Yale University
Ji Shen Yale University
Xianwen Shi University of Toronto
Sergei Vieira Silva IMPA
Rakesh Vohra Northwestern University
Asher Wolinsky Northwestern University
Xundong Yin Toulouse School of Economics and EHESS
Yongchao Zhang National University of Singapore

This list does not include people who only participated in the workshops or the summer school.

Poster TP_2009_05.jpg
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