May 18 - August 21, 2026

Organizers: Anna Bogomolnaia, Florian Brandl, Laura Doval, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack

Description: In recent years, research on mechanism design has been fueled by the proliferation of ideas from adjacent areas, novel mathematical tools, and emerging large-scale applications. This trimester program aims to advance mechanism design theory by utilizing and deepening these insights. In particular, it will investigate synergies between mechanism design and information design, extend the theory beyond expected utility theory, and study mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The program will offer a series of events focused on these topics and host researchers at all levels working on mechanism design and related topics.

The online application platform to participate in this trimester program will open approx. one year prior to the start of the program.

June 1 - 5, 2026

Venue: HIM lecture hall (Poppelsdorfer Allee 45, Bonn)

Organizers: Anna Bogomolnaia, Florian Brandl, Laura Doval, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack

This school features talks on topics in mechanism design theory of recent interest. The emphasis is on topics closely related to the program's core objectives. Participation in the school prepares attendees for researching current questions in mechanism design.

June 15 - 19, 2026

Venue: HIM lecture hall (Poppelsdorfer Allee 45, Bonn)

Organizers: Anna Bogomolnaia, Florian Brandl

Mechanism design without transfers considers the case when outcomes are allocations of objects to agents and do not involve monetary transfers between the agents. There are various legal, ethical, or practical reasons motivating this restriction. The absence of transfers limits the extent to which mechanism design goals can be achieved. The literature thus focuses on proving the existence of and constructing allocations with economically desirable properties rather than incentive-compatible mechanisms implementing those. Indeed, such mechanisms often fail to exist. Recently, this line of work has been picked up by theoretical computer scientists since it gives rise to various computational questions. This workshop focuses on fair division, matching, and other allocation problems without transfers.

June 29 - July 3, 2026

Venue: HIM lecture hall (Poppelsdorfer Allee 45, Bonn)

Organizers: Laura Doval, Andreas Kleiner

The workshop brings together research at the intersection of mechanism design and information design. Traditionally, mechanism design studies the design of optimal institutions, taking the information structure as given, whereas information design studies the design of optimal information structures, within a given institution. Recent applications have highlighted the importance of jointly determining mechanisms together with how information is used by the mechanism (e.g., limited commitment, aftermarkets, robust mechanism design) and how the tools of information/mechanism design can be used to answer questions of mechanism/information design (e.g., delegation). The goal of the workshop is to introduce participants to this new frontier of design by showcasing the latest research in the area.

July 13 - 17, 2026

Venue: Lipschitz-Saal (Endenicher Allee 60, Bonn)

Organizers: Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack

The outcome of a mechanism is, from the perspective of an agent, uncertain ex-ante since the other agents’ types are unknown or the mechanism itself randomizes over outcomes. Most work on mechanism design assumes that agents maximize their expected utility when faced with uncertainty. There is, however, strong empirical evidence that expected utility theory does not explain agents’ behavior in common mechanism design settings well. This workshop aims to promote a more general theory for mechanism design without the expected utility hypothesis by combining the expertise on decision-making under uncertainty in the decision theory community with methods from mechanism design.